The U.S. is working its way through a ‘strategic contraction’
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Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Minister of External Affairs of India speaks at a bilateral meeting held in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Anton Raharjo | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images
India’s minister of external affairs, which is also the largest democracy in the world and the second most populous, shared with me an idea that captures the moment.
Subrahmanyam JaishankarOne of the most keen international thinkers in these uncertain times is a belief that America, after many years of unparalleled global leadership, has entered a period of strategic contraction. This is one of the four key factors that are shaping our time.
Three other factors: China’s increasing relevance in nearly every part of the globe; the rise and influence of large, regionally and internationally important powers (India is at the top of that list); as well as the development of “shareholder groups” Jaishankar calls ad-hoc and interest-based. He argued that the latter will not replace treaty alliances but work alongside them.
He cites as an example the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as “the Quad”) of the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia — which was born in 2007 and, after a brief pause, was reestablished in 2017 but has gained greater relevance recently. He mentions, in addition, that “new quad”In October, the United States, India, Israel and the United Arab Emirates were all announced.
Jaishankar does not consider U.S. strategic contraction a hypothetical matter. Rather, he sees it as an actuality that has been occurring since Obama’s “leading form behind,” right through Trump’s “America First” and on to the Biden administration’s “Build Back better” mantra with its focus on home rebuilding.
His calculations show that the U.S. will remain the world’s largest power, but the United States is now more open to collaboration and realistic. That is what we are witnessing, especially under Biden. This contraction helps to create a transitional order from the Cold War period where U.S. and Soviet competition, through the post-Cold War years U.S. dominance, to the next period.
As with all changes, there are risks. China tests its new power, Russia tries to gain ground, while the U.S. tries to deal with an uncertain world.
I spoke with the Indian minister at Dubai and have shared my thoughts on U.S. Strategic Contraction with European and Middle Eastern officials. This term is very familiar to them.
The unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal in Afghanistan, which allowed for the Taliban’s return to power and their support of fighting it, is still a shock to our partners. As they look around, they see Russia’s growing military presence near Ukraine and a refugee crisis at the Belarusian border. They also notice increasing Chinese military pressure on Taiwan. These people are increasingly unsure of Washington’s ability to navigate the challenges they face, and know that Washington is not ready for this alone.
Those who say the U.S. should withdraw from international affairs are mistaken. Washington will still be an important voice in key areas, including nuclear proliferation and climate changes. U.S. isolationism cannot be tolerated in a globalized world where engagement and attention are required.
U.S. allies have noticed — and they’re concerned
Now, our partners are seeing a U.S. which is less internationally focused and confident but more internally focused. It’s guided by a careful calculation of its potential leverage and resources. This U.S., which has been hampered by political polarization and public weariness at the expense of global leadership, is now seen as less secure and less internally-focused.
They are in agreement with Biden’s belief that America must improve its domestic capabilities to be able to take on the world. The new $1.2 Trillion infrastructure bill is welcomed by them. They also closely watch the approximately $2 trillion climate- and social-spending bills, which were passed Friday in the House and sent to the Senate.
However, America’s close friends and allies are the most worried by U.S. democracy’s uncertain future. The former U.S. president Donald Trump is still refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy and the Biden government has struggled to get broad public support.
As I traveled through Europe and Middle East in the last month, I was struck at how many people started conversations asking about the state and future of democracy in the United States. This topic is more important to our partners than China’s rise as an authoritarian power.
This is not a new fact. The world watches closely the U.S. domestic policies. It seems that our allies are more confused than us when we ask if Americans recognize the risks of democracy being eroded and are prepared to deal with them. Surprised at how frequently my foreign friends cited Robert Kagan’s. recent foreboding pieceThe Washington Post reports that “our constitutional crisis has already arrived.”
Leçons from U.S. “strategic contraction” in Afghanistan
The U.S.’s speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan seems to have most affected our partners. It was done without any consultation with other allies, or Mideast partners. They fear that an extremist-run country will emerge and terrorist safe havens may reappear.
According to a Middle Eastern official, “It did not say anything good about U.S. leadership,” he said. “Even Taliban were surprised at how quick it all happened.”
This picture shows a world that is more multipolar and regionally oriented. It is unlikely to be divided into distinct camps between China and America. America’s key allies are too dependent on China for their major trading partners and they will resist any attempt at global or-and.
U.S. partners will look to new regional arrangements, involving the U.S. where possible, and they will promote their trading and security interests in a pragmatic way, participating if invited into larger U.S. schemes like the Biden administration’s upcoming democracy summit or “Build Back Better World” approach laid out at the Group of Seven summit in June as a sort of answer to Beijing’s belt-and-road initiative.
At the same time, U.S. partners and allies will hedge their bets, more certain about China’s course — even though they may not like it — than they are about the U.S. trajectory.
Our partners believe that the U.S. will once more play the same role as it did during World War II. It helped to establish the institutions and the world of postwar times and also determined the outcome of the Cold War.
U.S. Partners feel that they must navigate what they see: U.S. strategic contraction.
—Frederick Kempe is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council.
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