By Phil Stewart

WASHINGTON, (Reuters) – Hours prior to Kabul falling to the Taliban on August 15, Afghanistan’s Air Force began melting down. Some airmen were fighting one another instead of launching air strikes against the advancing insurgents.

The incident was reported by the Afghan Air Force pilot who flew the helicopter, and two other witnesses. The chopper’s destination was across town, but the guardsmen were convinced it was leaving the country and were determined not to be left behind, the pilot told Reuters. One guard pointed his gun towards the cockpit, in an attempt to stop them.

Bedlam ensued. The shots rang out. The helicopter was struck by bullets. The pilot was injured by debris and metal flying from the helicopter. Both were taken to hospital for treatment. “My face became full of blood,” the pilot said.

The U.S. supported government collapsed faster than anyone could have predicted due to Ashraf Ghani, Afghan president. The Taliban attacked Kabul within hours. This triggered a chaos American evacuation which has severely damaged Joe Biden’s presidency.

The melee involving Afghan Air Force members ahead of Kabul’s fall hasn’t been previously reported. Reuters received exclusive information from former Afghan officials and airmen who were part of the operation to fly Ghani with his entourage to Uzbekistan’s Aug. 15 and what role chaos played in his departure.

These episodes were among more than two dozen accounts compiled and analyzed by Reuters. They include pilots and military personnel as well as veterans from the war in Afghanistan. The stories of these individuals provide fresh insight into the end of the Afghan Air Force. It was the country’s crown jewel.

To give Kabul an advantage over Islamic insurgents, the United States spent billions on building a military force to fly in Afghanistan. Many Taliban fighters were killed in bombing raids. They had no air force.

However, the project collapsed within weeks of the United States withdrawing its support mid-2021 in part of their final pullout.

Soldiers who were protecting the airbases from unprotected militants took over in their sneakers, and sometimes with heavy pickup trucks. Ammunition ran low. The aircraft fell into ruin. In order to defend Kabul, which was the last remaining stronghold government in Afghanistan, pilots took a number of working planes and choppers with them back to Kabul.

However, they wouldn’t execute such a strategy. News of Ghani’s departure triggered a mass exodus of airmen trying to save their equipment – and themselves. Aircrews, pilots, and their families piled into planes to flee the country. More than a quarter of the nation’s fleet ended up in neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Afghan and U.S. officials say.

One former official of the Afghan Air Force stated that “To be truthful, we lost control” in the final stages.

This rapid fall caused the Pentagon to immediately send U.S. forces into Kabul to disable dozens more U.S.-supplied planes left behind and render them ineffective to the Taliban.

John Michel, who was a former brigadier general and led the U.S. military training mission for Afghanistan Air Force, said that he was sad but not surprised by the end result. The U.S. training mission for the Afghan Air Force was not designed to be used in a country like Afghanistan, he claims.

Michel declared, “It was an ambitious project, which was from the start doomed.”

BUILT FOR FAIL

This rapid collapse was representative of wider failings in the U.S. 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.

As proof of the American drive to develop a military capable of fighting the Taliban, the Afghan Air Force was also held up. This effort resulted in hundreds of brave pilots, who were able to perform admirably when under attack. However, the core function of the force was dependent on America’s partners in aircraft maintenance and logistics. Afghanistan was a poor country, plagued by corruption and lacked both the right military-industrial environment and the deep pool of talents required to make it a successful endeavor.

The Biden administration’s decision this year to withdraw from Afghanistan all U.S. military personnel and contractors supporting the Afghan Air Force quickly exposed this weakness. Remote support personnel could not be replaced by video chats.

When confronted by Reuters about its findings on the negative effects of ending assistance hands-on, the Pentagon claimed that it continued to support the Afghan Air Force after withdrawal. This included paying pilots their salaries and training them overseas. The Pentagon also said that they had conducted strikes from bases overseas in support for Afghan air force ground troops.

General Frank McKenzie from the U.S. army’s Central Command told Congress in April that he was worried about “the Afghan Air Force being able to fly…after we remove support for those planes.”

This didn’t happen quickly. While the Taliban took over Afghanistan’s provinces one after another, the Afghan Air Force was set to contribute more than ever in support of the ground war. Overuse and poor maintenance were causing aircraft to fail. Pentagon data shows that one-fifth of its five available aircraft was destroyed between June and July.

Reuters also learned that ammunition was scarce. A pilot from Afghanistan, Shah (who asked not to be identified) recalled flying dangerously in July for a medical evacuation mission to help wounded and deceased Afghan soldiers in Spin Boldak near the Pakistan border. Shah claimed that he was equipped with two MD-530 assault helicopters, which he used to transport his UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter. The pilot who was assisting Shah said they had low ammunition so might not be capable of helping if he came under Taliban fire.

Shah described an agonizing scramble to the spot for recovery. He recalled, “We were stacking up bodies.” High risk meant that there wasn’t enough time for them to test their hearts. Shah still lives in Afghanistan and is hiding from Taliban.

According to Hamdullah, Mohib, Afghanistan’s national security advisor, a shortage of laser-guided explosive bombs that could be used to precisely target Taliban positions in Kabul was also a secret during the last weeks of war.

Mohib stated to Reuters that the fear was “that if we make this information public, it will further encourage Taliban fighters and demoralize ground troops.”

The Pentagon confirmed to Reuters that it had stopped the delivery of GBU58 laser-guided missile bombs before Afghanistan fell, though they didn’t elaborate. According to a U.S. defense representative, Washington does not consider that the decision has harmed Afghan military operations.

Afghan Air Force pilots like Colonel Mohammad Tawiq Safi were the lords of Afghanistan’s skies, and they found themselves in danger when their bases at regional air stations below fell to Taliban.

Safi, a commander of wing in Mazar-e-Sharif responsible for operations in northern and northeast Afghanistan, was known as Safi. He said to Reuters that he was aware of trouble when the local Afghan Army soldiers stopped returning his calls on August 14. The soldiers meant to defend the city and his airfield had suddenly folded. They were left to their own devices, with only 150 remaining airmen.

Safi ordered his pilots to withdraw to Kabul 200 miles away. This is where the Afghan Air Force had planned to regroup to counter-attack. The fast-closing insurgents had already struck Safi’s A-29 Super Tucano Light Attack plane. Safi made a successful landing but sustained severe injuries. Safi was airlifted from the accident site and taken by helicopter to Uzbekistan, where he was treated for injuries. He was then flown to Uzbekistan, where he was eventually evacuated to America in October.

Afghan pilots were also targeted by the Taliban. The Islamic militants focused their attention on assassinating pilots when they left base in the last months of war – an intentional strategy to reduce the U.S. government’s declining air advantage. At least seven pilots were killed off base this year in a series of targeted killings https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-pilots-assassinated-by-taliban-us-withdraws-2021-07-09, Reuters reported in July.

There would be more. Hamidullah habibi, an American-trained Black Hawk helicopter pilot and Black Hawk instructor, may have been the last one to be killed in this Taliban strike campaign. A week before the Taliban seized Kabul, Habibi was killed in the capital on Aug. 7 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-air-force-pilot-killed-kabul-bombing-attack-claimed-by-taliban-2021-08-07 by a sticky bomb attached to a vehicle, former officials and a family member said. Taliban claimed the responsibility.

Airmen faced threats from fellow citizens as Afghanistan became unglued. Some Afghans will do whatever it takes to climb aboard their planes, which provided them with a means of escape.

In northwest Afghanistan, Herat was the foreshadowing of the Aug. 15 fight between Kabul’s airmen.

On August 12, the Taliban won Herat. The Taliban declared victory in Herat on Aug. 12.

Sources in Afghanistan said that Abdul Sabur Qane was Herat’s province governor and Ismail Khan was a powerful commander of militias. They demanded they were flown out along with two other friends. They were refused by the Afghan Army. The base was home to hundreds of soldiers and two helicopters. They said, “Either everybody leaves or nobody does.”

Pilot: “The soldiers didn’t permit them to” take the choppers.

Khan and his accomplices were captured later by Taliban. They were then freed. Khan and Qane were not available for comment.

WRECKING BALB

The United States left behind an arsenal of weapons that would arm America’s enemies in the future, even after it lost its war against the Taliban. Pictures from Afghanistan show insurgents carrying M4 Carbine assault weapons, wearing American-made armor and driving U.S. supplied armored vehicles. It was also an important mission of the United States to make sure they didn’t inherit an Air Force.

Afghan pilots claim that 46 of the aircraft they flew to Uzbekistan were theirs, with another 17, possibly to Tajikistan. According to U.S. officials speaking with Reuters, they are considering requests from Central Asian countries for the right to retain some of those aircraft.

U.S. Army Major Frank Kessler’s handiwork was then evident. Kessler, a member of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division flew to Afghanistan in August 17, just two days after Kabul fell. He was assigned to find and destroy military equipment from Afghanistan, as well as aircraft.

Kessler stated that his group of around 100 individuals had located 73 aircraft at Kabul Airport. Kessler’s job was made harder by a restriction handed down from top brass: Don’t use explosives and keep a low profile.

In August, the international spotlight was intensely focused on Kabul’s airport. Washington reached a delicate agreement with the Taliban in order to let the U.S. conduct evacuations at the airport through August 31. Further panic could be caused by the explosion of aircraft at the airport, which may further alarm the crowds of Afghans who were trying to board their flights. This sound could also alert the Taliban to the fact that Americans are destroying the most valuable spoils from war. It was necessary to use subtler techniques.

Kessler explained that it was impossible to attach C-4 (explosives), or a thermite bomb, to the equipment.

The team destroyed the majority of the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters. He refused to give details. A U.S. defense official spoke on condition of anonymity and said that the act of sabotage ranged from low-rent vandalism like clogging fuel lines using sand, to the destruction of high-tech, sensitive equipment. After the U.S. evacuate, media outlets released images of Kabul’s airport showing planes and choppers with their windows smashed in and their avionics broken and missing.

Kessler stated that Air Force personnel were present to help understand the planes’ workings and make them work better.

According to the Taliban, it has aspirations to create its own Air Force. U.S.-trained Afghan pilots were encouraged to go into hiding and help.

It has been difficult to find a buyer.

Six Afghan Air Force members are still in Afghanistan and told Reuters that they fear for their country’s former enemies. Five hiding men described taking precautions such as moving from one house to another, deleting sensitive data from their phones, and sometimes, seperating from loved ones due to concerns for the safety of their family members.

David Hicks (a U.S. retired brigadier-general who once led training for Afghanistan’s Air Force) now heads a charity which helps former Afghan soldiers. Although his group claims it helped hundreds of fleeing families, there are many more people still in Afghanistan.

Hicks declared, “It’s no understatement to state that they’re at a very difficult place.”

Final FLIGHT

Two Afghan Air Force pilots were injured in an Aug. 15 incident at Kabul’s airport. Airfield security prevented another Afghan Air Force helicopter taking off. Ghani assigned the helicopter to his presidential fleet. According to Afghans, it was finally cleared for departure after one of its pilots argued with forces. Ghani’s security then intervened, as several Afghans with knowledge of the incident say.

President Trump’s inner circle was worried about the standoff. Mohib Mohib, a national security adviser told Reuters that concerns were mounting about Ghani’s protection forces. Mohib indicated that Ghani was forced out of Afghanistan by the incident, although it wasn’t the only reason.

Mohib stated that one of the main reasons it was decided to evacuate was that the helicopter had been taken hostage. “There was a fear that (Afghan soldiers), might have gone rogue.”

Ghani, his entourage and some top-ranking officials began to board three helicopters from the palace grounds for a escape to Uzbekistan. One pilot told Reuters. After the president, his wife and some top-ranking officials, including Mohib, were aboard, some of Ghani’s bodyguards fought each other for the remaining seats, exchanging punches, a pilot told Reuters.

Three helicopters flew together from the palace just before three o’clock in the afternoon. They were flying low to avoid radar, and then headed north to keep their mission secret. In short order, a fourth helicopter was also on the way. The crew had to order body armor to be thrown onboard because one of the helicopters was too full. Four aircraft were capable of carrying 54 people. Half of these passengers included presidential security.

Minutes before liftoff, pilots were informed their destinations. According to two pilots, they didn’t know their family and went home with their flight suit. Uzbek officials also were shocked. Two Afghan pilots said that the unannounced arrival of Afghans at Termez airport triggered a panic by Uzbek security.

The Uzbek foreign Ministry declined to comment.

Ghani, upon his arrival on Uzbek soil made a final token of gratitude to the crew.

According to Reuters, one pilot said that the President had saved their lives.

Ghani soon flew on to Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which announced he and his family had been admitted on “humanitarian grounds.”

Reuters could not reach Ghani via the UAE foreign minister or through former members of his cabinet.

Around 17 airmen – pilots, flight engineers and maintenance crew – had helmed Ghani’s mad dash to Uzbekistan. On Aug. 16, they boarded a charter plane to Abu Dhabi and were eventually moved into a refugee camp. They are all still waiting for U.S. resettlement.

Interviews with Reuters revealed that two pilots asked for American assistance, claiming they are feeling forgotten by the U.S. government and concerned for the safety of their Afghan families.

One said, “We did our duty.”

Abu Dhabi’s U.S. Embassy spokesperson declined to discuss the individual cases of the pilots, but did say that it was top priority to process, screen and vet Afghans for relocation to America.