By Francois Murphy

VIENNA (Reuters) – Talks on reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal are to resume in Vienna on Monday, with Iran’s atomic advances raising doubt https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/low-expectations-nuclear-talks-iran-creates-facts-grounds-2021-11-28 as to whether a breakthrough can be made to bring Tehran and the United States back into full compliance with the accord.

The deal was renegotiated in 2018 by the United States, under President Donald Trump. Iran violated several of the restrictions that were meant to increase the amount of time needed to produce enough fissile materials for nuclear weapons. This is known as the “breakout period”.

Iran insists that it does not want to enrich uranium beyond its civil use. However, many believe Iran may be trying to leverage indirect talks with America by moving closer to producing a nuclear weapon.

Is Iran really close to the ability to do this, and how restrictive are those restrictions?

BREAKOUT TIME

Experts usually estimate that breakout takes between three and six weeks, but experts say that weaponisation could take up to two years. Israel’s finance minister recently said https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-minister-says-iran-could-have-nuclear-arms-within-5-years-2021-11-23 Iran could have nuclear weapons within five years.

ENRICHMENT

Iran cannot enrich uranium above 3.67% purity. This is far lower than the 90% of weapons-grade uranium or 20% Iran achieved before the deal. Iran now enriches at various levels with the most being 60%.

Iran will be able to produce or accumulate enriched uranium only with just more than 5000 of its most inefficient, first-generation centrifuges at a single facility, the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.

Iran can now enrich its research without accumulating enriched uranium. The agreement also allows Iran to use small amounts of high-efficiency centrifuges that are at least twice the efficiency as the IR-1.

Iran currently refines uranium using hundreds of sophisticated centrifuges at both the FEP at Natanz and at the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Station (PFEP).

The plant is enriching itself with over 1,000 IR-1s from Fordow (a plant buried in a mountain) and has plans to continue the process with 100 more advanced centrifuges.

URANIUM STOCKPILE

The International Atomic Energy Agency, policing Iranian nuclear activities, estimated this month https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/11/gov2021-51.pdf that Tehran’s stock of enriched uranium is just under 2.5 tonnes, more than 12 times the 202.8-kg (446-pound) limit imposed by the deal, but less than the more than five tonnes it had before the deal.

However, the enrichment is increasing and it has 17.7kg of uranium up to 60%. One nuclear bomb can be made with 25 kg worth of weapons-grade Uranium.

INSPECTIONS & MONITORING

Iran was required to implement IAEA’s Additional Protocol. This allows Iran to inspect undeclared locations in a snap. The deal also increased IAEA surveillance by cameras and other devices, beyond core activities and inspections that are covered under Iran’s lengthy-standing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Iran has stopped implementing the Additional Protocol and is allowing the extra monitoring to continue only in a black-box-type arrangement https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea-deal-idUSKBN2AN1UU, whereby the data from cameras and other devices is collected and stored but the IAEA does not have access to it, at least for the time being.

The one exception https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-chief-says-negotiations-iran-proved-inconclusive-2021-11-24 to the continued monitoring is a centrifuge-parts workshop at the TESA Karaj complex, which was hit by apparent sabotage in June that destroyed one of four IAEA cameras there, after which Iran removed all of them. Since then, Iran has refused to allow the IAEA to reinstall the cameras.

POTENTIAL WAPONISATION

Iran has made uranium metal that is both 20% enriched and non-enriched. Because making uranium metallic is an important step in producing bombs, and every country that has made it before will eventually develop nuclear weapons, this alarms the West.

Iran declares that it works on reactor fuel.