By Francois Murphy

VIENNA (Reuters – The direct talks between Tehran AND Washington in order to revive the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal are at the end of the road, delegates said. But, they say that some issues are still unresolved. It is also unclear if an agreement will be reached.

Iran broke many restrictions of the 2018 agreement that extended Iran’s time to create enough fissile material to construct an atom bomb. This was in addition to the fact that the United States pulled out from the accord in 2018.

Diplomats claim that this time is commonly referred to by the term “breakout” and will never return to one year, even if an accord is reached. This is due to the fact that Iran’s knowledge has grown beyond what was allowed under the agreement. However, if Iran were to return to its restrictions in general it would prolong breakout time.

Iran insists that it does not want to enrich its uranium for civilian purposes. However, many believe it may be trying to keep all of its options open and to at least gain some leverage in negotiations by moving closer to producing nuclear weapons.

The West believes that there is not enough time to reach an agreement with Iran because Iran’s nuke program is so advanced, it will be obsolete soon. What is Iran’s progress towards making an Atom Bomb? How far has Iran gone beyond the restrictions of the agreement?

BREAKOUT TIME

Based on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s last quarterly report https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/11/gov2021-51.pdf on Iran’s nuclear activities, which was published in November, experts have generally put breakout time at around three to six weeks but say weaponisation would take longer – often roughly two years.

In November, Israel’s Finance Minister stated that Iran might have nuclear arms within five years.

The science of estimating breakout time isn’t perfect. It is also difficult to predict where it will stand in an agreement that is still to be published or finalised. Diplomats and analysts estimate that it will take six months.

ENRICHMENT

This deal limits Iran’s ability to enrich uranium at a purity of 3.67%. It is far less than the nearly 90% which are weapons-grade and the 20% Iran had before the agreement. Iran now enriches at various levels with the most being 60%.

Iran will be able to produce or accumulate enriched uranium only with just more than 5,000 of the least-efficient, first generation centrifuges in one facility, the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.

Iran can now enrich its research without accumulating enriched uranium. The agreement also allows Iran to use small amounts of high-efficiency centrifuges that are at least twice the efficiency as the IR-1.

Iran enriches uranium now with hundreds of high-tech centrifuges, both at the FEP (above ground) and the PFEP (aboveground), at Natanz.

This plant enriches with over 1,000 IR-1s in Fordow, a plant buried within a mountain and with more that 100 advanced centrifuges.

URANIUM STOCKPILE

The IAEA estimated in its November report https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/11/gov2021-51.pdf that Tehran’s stock of enriched uranium was just under 2.5 tonnes, more than 12 times the 202.8-kg (446-pound) limit imposed by the deal, but less than the more than five tonnes it had before the deal.

It is enriching at a greater level now than it did before the agreement. The deal has enriched it to around 16.7kg to as high as 60%. This is near the 90% purity for weapons-grade uranium. To make a nuclear bomb, it takes 25kg of weapons-grade Uranium.

According to diplomatic statements, any excess enriched radioactive uranium will be shipped to Russia or diluted. Iran will then return to the agreement’s limit of 3.67% enrichment.

INSPECTIONS & MONITORING

Iran agreed to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. It allows quick inspections at undeclared sites. The deal also increased IAEA surveillance by cameras and other devices, beyond core activities and inspections that are covered under Iran’s lengthy-standing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Iran is no longer implementing the Additional Protocol. Instead, Iran is agreeing to allow the additional monitoring to be continued only in a black box-type arrangement. This means that data collected from other devices and cameras is stored and collected, but not accessible to the IAEA, at least temporarily.

The arrangement was in place for over a year.

POTENTIAL WAPONISATION

Iran produced uranium metal with a 20% enrichment, despite being prohibited by the agreement. The West is alarmed because Iran has produced uranium metal enriched to 20%. This step is crucial in making bombs. No country has ever done this without developing nuclear weapons.

Iran declares that it works on reactor fuel.